
Google’s newest Chromebook – the Pixelbook Go is now official. The company unveiled the device on its “Made by Google ’19” event alongside other products. The Pixelbook Go is an affordable iteration to the original Pixelbook from 2017. But does the affordability justify its worth and will it hold out against the competition? Let’s find out!
Google Pixelbook Go
Thin, light, and fast – for a price.
Credit where credit is due; the Pixelbook Go is a welcome upgrade to its predecessor. Sporting a bigger 13.3-inch touchscreen display with a 15% larger battery, while simultaneously weighing less than the original Pixelbook is an amazing feat achieved by the company. The Pixelbook Go now comes in a magnesium chassis to Pixelbook’s aluminum with Grippable finish on the bottom making it easier to hold and carry. On a related note, it ditches the 360° hinge mechanism of the former Pixelbook and feels more like a premium laptop rather than a convertible.
Affordability is another hurdle that Google hopes to kinda-sorta pass through with the Pixelbook Go. The base model starts at $649 which is less than the asking price for the base model of Pixelbook but admittedly, is still expensive than Chromebooks by other manufacturers like Acer, Asus, Dell, HP, and Samsung. You get to choose between 4 models of the Pixelbook Go with varying processors, display quality, and memory configurations.
Okay, so what’s the catch here?
Performance level, of course. The cheapest variant is equipped with an 8th Gen Intel Core m3, 8GB of RAM, and a meager 64GB of SSD storage which cannot be further expanded using a microSD card. Bummer! Google really skimped on storage options this year. The Core m3 is a fairly powerful chip considering it’s a Chromebook, but I’d rather have an i5 or an i7. For $200 more, you can get the Pixelbook Go with 8th Gen Intel Core i5 and an upgraded 128GB storage.
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Furthermore, $999 gets you the same Pixelbook Go with the i5 processor with 16GB of RAM. The top-tier variant has 8th Gen Intel Core i7 processor, 16GB RAM, 256GB storage, and a 4K UHD display. Unlike the predecessor, there’s no NVMe SSD storage option.
Also read: Google Pixel 4 & Pixel 4XL launched!
Similarly, the Pixelbook Go’s Chrome OS hasn’t nearly been around as long as Microsoft’s Windows OS has. From the familiar UI to app support, the superiority of the latter is astounding. However, Chromebooks have come a long way since the days of supporting only web applications. Chromebooks support Packaged Apps (Chrome Apps), a select arsenal of Android apps and since 2018, Linux apps too.
Google Pixelbook Go Specifications
| Google Pixelbook Go | |
| Body | 12.2 x 8.1 x 0.5-inch; 1.061 kg |
| Display | 13.3-inch LCD touchscreen panel |
| Resolution | Full-HD Display (1920 x 1080) / 4K Ultra-HD Molecular Display (3840 x 2160); 16:9 aspect ratio |
| Battery | 47-Watt hour (FHD panel) / 56-Watt hour (4K UHD panel); Up to 12 hours of usage in a single charge |
| Processor | 8th Gen Intel Core m3 / i5 / i7 |
| RAM | 8 / 16GB |
| Storage | 64 / 128 / 256GB SSD |
| Audio | Dual front-firing speakers; 2mics for noise cancellation |
| Security | Titan C security chip; Built-in FIDO authenticator |
| Camera | Duo Cam; 2MP f/2.0 aperture |
| Keyboard | Full size with 19mm pitch; Hush Keys, Google Assistant Key; Backlit |
| Ports | 2 USB-C charging and display output; 3.5mm headphone jack |
| Connectivity | Wi-Fi: 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac, 2×2 (MIMO), dual-band (2.4 GHz, 5.0 GHz); Bluetooth 4.2 |
| Colors | Just Black, Not Pink |
| Price | $649 / $849 / $999 / $1,399 |
So who is the Pixelbook Go really for?
On an obvious note, the Google Pixelbook Go isn’t for the most hardcore users who need to run the most intricate of software or play AAA title games. Chances are, Pixelbook Go doesn’t even support those high-end softwares and AAA games.
The Pixelbook Go is perfect for those looking for simple low-end computing, web browsing, and media consumption on an ultra-thin, beautiful, lightweight, and power-efficient build. If you’re embedded into Google’s ecosystem and its products, the Pixelbook Go is the way to go.
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Google Pixelbook Go vs the options
A quid pro quo!
As mentioned earlier, there are tons of other Chromebooks or Windows laptops you could go for instead of the Pixelbook Go. Consequently, there will be some trade-offs in either of the options. The Pixelbook Go will give you a clean UI, advance security through its Titan C chip, a quieter “Hush” keyboard, and an all-day battery. On the contrary, other Chromebooks can give you 360° flip for tablet mode, a better value for your investment, so on and so forth. Similarly, a Windows machine will give you more power and versatility at a similar cost.
For instance, you could get the Asus Chromebook Flip (C302CA) which has similar specs at a lower price than the base model of the Pixelbook Go. Comparatively, the Dell XPS 13 or the recently launched Surface Laptop 3 proves to be a better and more powerful machine, though unescorted by the Pixelbook Go’s battery performance.





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![Best Flagship Smartphones To Buy In Nepal [Updated] Like Keynesianism of any variety, green Keynesianism requires a vigorous state. Its political limits lie here, for the liberal-democratic state—at least as it currently exists—is entirely unlikely to create a green Keynesianism, at least one adequate to the problems we face. And were it capable, it would take too long. Green Keynesianism is thus a contradiction on political grounds; one with great consequences. Perhaps Keynesianism’s greatest flaw is its inability to even imagine that the work required might be done without the state, because it assumes a priori that the market is the state’s only “outside. ”52 For Keynesians (and perhaps for all liberals), the state and market fill all the space of the social; they cannot conceive of a world in which there are multiple social fields, other spaces in which organizational or allocative work is possible. This conceptual limit is perfectly coextensive with elite common sense: all important action happens in the realm of the state or the market, and it is a zero-sum game (this is why liberals accuse state-backed investment of “crowding out” private capital—from their perspective, there is nothing else out there to be pushed aside). Consequently, since the market has already demonstrated its inadequacy to the task, the state is an existential sine qua non. For all the libertarian babble of “free markets, ” there is no elite social group in the world that wants the state to disappear. On the contrary, the capture of the state is almost always a defining characteristic of elite status. This helps explain why Keynesianism—green or otherwise—is so attractive in moments of crisis, and why other options seem so utopian, futile, or doomed. Keynesianism in any one nation assumes and requires a sovereign state monopolizing both the legitimate use of violence and the legitimate allocation of resources within its territory. But planetary warming exposes the territorial nation-state as insufficient to address the crisis. With the surface of the globe covered in a chaotic and lumpy arrangement of adjacent but supposedly distinct and non-overlapping parcels, each of which has some capacity to contribute to everyone else’s calamity, it is clear to global elites that no individual or subgroup of contemporary states are up to the task. What is obviously necessary is a means of governance that is not beholden to modern state sovereignty, at the same time that this necessity is denied by some of those very sovereign states. For a green Keynesian solution to the problem of catastrophic climate change, the problem of the state resolves itself only in its seemingly inescapable lack of resolution. The regulatory and decision-making role of the state, not to mention the form it takes, is completely and utterly indeterminate. The scale of the problems is so great, it seems impossible to confront them without the state, but it seems just as impossible that the state as currently constituted is going to get the job done. We face a situation in which there is, under current geopolitical and geoeconomic arrangements, no right answer. To restate the political paradox more sharply: to address its contradictions— including the ecological contradiction that capital’s growth is destroying the planet—capitalism needs a planetary manager, a Keynesian world state. But elites have proven reluctant to build it, and it appears unlikely to miraculously realize itself. So, the only apparent capitalist solution to climate change is presently impossible; the only even marginally possible green Keynesianism that could save us is still predicated upon the territorial nation-state. The necessary, logical corollary is to scale all the way up: in the face of planetary climate change, the success of green Keynesian programs in any one nation depends upon the commitment of all other nations. Hence the motivation to create a kind of global Green New Deal, a “Green Bretton Woods, ” which is clearly the idealized objective of liberal and progressive forces at every COP from Copenhagen to Paris (or wherever we next invest our hopes). 53 This planetary Keynesianism is supposed to diminish the otherwise “inevitable” realpolitik that corrupts an aggregation of merely domestic arrangements by limiting the free rider or collective action problems associated with the market failure that plagues the “quintessential case of global commons. ” As Dani Rodrik puts it, “absent cosmopolitan considerations, each nation’s optimal strategy would be to emit freely and to free-ride on the carbon controls of other countries” —the “tragedy of the commons” at a planetary scale. 54 Because Keynesianism is constructed on the assumption that self-interest and public interest can only be reconciled by the state, a pragmatic, liberal realism would look for an answer in a higher power, one that could suppress or at least contain the urge to free ride. But because of its irreducibly sovereign basis, no green Keynesian program can imagine anything other than a cosmopolitan basis for doing so, a basis which violates its own foundation in state-based sovereign autonomy. It cannot propose to construct a mechanism with a “self-interest” in planetary “ecological stimulus”55 because that mechanism or institution would obviously require coercive power over the national component parts of the planet in which its power is “interested. ” The logical conclusion of this line of thought is as clear as it is significant. A transnational Keynesianism can only be predicated on the consolidation of a transnational variation on the sovereign subject without which Keynesianism is inconceivable. A planetary green Keynesianism, the only kind that might have a hope of confronting the problem in its scale and magnitude, is thus forced down one of two planetary paths—both of which lead, ultimately, to the same destination. The first path involves the construction of a consensual global agreement in which all parties find, if not something good, at least something better than the status quo. As Stiglitz says, “effective action has to be global; but given the deficiencies in the current system of global governance, action adequate to what needs to be done has yet to be taken. ”56 Thus the contortions required by the climate treaty planners to make such an agreement imaginable, let alone workable; a plan that is essential is impossible—yet something must be done. 57 This is why the proposals always seem so formulaic and empty, and virtually never involve substantive targets or means and timelines for implementation. 58 The diagnosis of the problem continually takes us to the edge of the chasm between what we know is necessary and the common sense judgment that it is totally impossible. So, to delay acknowledging that the impossible is necessary, “we” gather together at the precipice and list to each other all the qualities of a geopolitics that would make the chasm disappear. One recent assessment by influential US economists, for example, tells us that any effective global agreement will have to involve all of the following: global cooperation, adequate incentives for participation and compliance, equitability, cost-effectiveness, consistency with the international regime, verifiability, practicality, and realism. 59 The very conditions these thought experiments impose on the structure of agreements (a paradoxical response to a problem associated with realpolitik) make such proposals effectively unrealizable. It is like designing a bridge—a universalist, participatory, climate ethics that crosses the chasm of the “world’s biggest collective action problem” to a global village on the other side—that we know will never be able to support our weight. From Kyoto to Paris, we are left stranded; hearts filled with hope, feet on crumbling soil. We therefore come face to face with the cruel specter of the second possible path: the emergence of one nation-state, or a small set of nation-states, that arrogate to themselves the impossible institutional capacities that come with an interest in supranational “ecological stimulus. ” This is a Climate Leviathan that can bear the burdens required of a planetary Keynesian subject, capable of coordinating investment, distributing productive and destructive capacity, and managing free riders. The differences between the results of these two sovereignties, if any, is unclear. Both could fill the role of Leviathan. And, to the extent that it is reasonable to expect war as the solution for a world in which isolated nation- states pursue their struggles against an uneven wave of environmental disasters, even domestic green Keynesianisms lead here. We must not forget that Keynesianism was a product of world war and depended deeply upon it. One way or another, however reluctantly, the logic of capital in the Anthropocene points toward planetary sovereignty. We must therefore consider the conditions for its potential emergence.](https://cdn.gadgetbytenepal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Best-Flagship-Phones-who-is-it-ft.jpg)